13 עקרונות
13 Principles
١٣ مبدا

13 Principles

for an Agreement on Jerusalem in the Framework of a Political Solution

"The fabric of life and freedom of movement must be maintained, within the framework of an open city where each collective can conduct their lives in an autonomous and sovereign manner, both independently and in relation to one another."
02

A. Nature of Agreement and Distribution of Powers

1. Under any political constellation, the two peoples (and many groups within them) will live side by side in Jerusalem. Beyond constituting a core political issue, Jerusalem is a city with a shared daily reality, even if an unequal one. A sustainable solution for Jerusalem must take into account both of these aspects and create a horizon for an equitable future that recognizes both peoples' full range of ties to the city and ensures their capacity to lead their daily lives—as well as their public, religious, and political activities— side by side, free of fear, and in an independent and equitable manner.

2. The proposed solution in this paper is based on a flexible arrangement that enables self-determination and interdependence. Since 1967, extensive connections and interdependence have developed between the two parts of the city, even if under a reality of occupation and deep discrimination. Israeli construction beyond the Green Line has reduced the distance between Israeli neighborhoods/settlements and Palestinian neighborhoods, and the seam lines between them have grown increasingly thin. A barrier separating the city would not only be ineffective, but could also harm physical and communal spaces, intensifying resentment and hostility. Thus, the fabric of life and freedom of movement must be maintained, within the framework of an open city where each collective can conduct their lives in an autonomous and sovereign manner, both independently and in relation to one another.

3. The proposed structure will require a framework of joint oversight in which participation of third parties must also be considered: The United Nations, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and moderate actors or representatives from the world’s three major religions. The involvement of these parties is also desirable in helping to protect human rights and maintain favorable conditions for a solution prior to its achievement.

B. Borders, Territorial Sovereignty, and Holy Sites

4. Clear borders are a condition for autonomous life and for each collective’s capacity to develop as a community, preserve its heritage, and develop its physical spaces according to its needs. This is especially true in Jerusalem where, since 1967, severe restrictions have been imposed on the physical development of the Palestinian population, and where many land reserves in East Jerusalem have been expropriated for Israeli settlements. The Clinton Parameters (2001) proposed that the Israeli neighborhoods built since 1967 beyond the Green Line would be included within the boundaries of Israeli Jerusalem based on a land swap—a principle that was tentatively accepted by both sides. {2} However, since then, tens of thousands of additional housing units have been planned and constructed in existing and new Israeli settlements. Given this reality, any advancement towards a political solution would first require the immediate cessation of land confiscation and settlement advancement, along with fair land swaps of equal quantitative and qualitative value in exchange for lands already confiscated. Preferably, settlement enclaves in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods should be dismantled and vacated, given their proven harm to the fabric of Palestinian life and to relations between Israelis and Palestinians in the city. In the event that they were to remain in place, they should not retain a separate status within the territory that would be under Palestinian authority in the framework of a political agreement.

5. Territorial contiguity must be ensured both within East Jerusalem and between it and the West Bank. Palestinians could consider expanding East Jerusalem eastward (toward E1, a-Ram, and other West Bank territory) where there are additional land reserves for development, just as Israelis could expand West Jerusalem westwards (preferably with respect to environmental considerations). However, it should be underscored that this is not another incarnation of the “Abu Dis plan” {3} : West Bank territory will constitute an addition, not a substitute, for East Jerusalem’s organic urban contiguity. Furthermore, East Jerusalem neighborhoods beyond the separation barrier are an integral part of Palestinian Jerusalem and should not be separated from the city’s urban space and population. {4}

6. The Old City is the core of East Jerusalem and an integral part of its sovereign space. {5}At the same time, it is home to a high concentration of holy sites for both peoples and for the world’s three major monotheistic religions. Freedom of access to holy sites must be ensured for all. To this end, special management arrangements should be considered with the support of the aforementioned international entities, especially the Jordanian government. {6} Unnecessary expansion of these arrangements into other areas of the Old City basin should be avoided. Specific sites may be included on a reciprocal basis as necessary, but the use of holy and heritage sites (whether recognized or 'newly recognized') as a basis for the appropriation of further territorial control and contiguity must be avoided.{7} The status quo must be maintained: the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif compound will remain a Muslim place of worship under Palestinian-Jordanian management, and the Western Wall Plaza will remain a Jewish place of worship under Israeli management

C. Citizenship Status, Municipal Services, and Freedom of Movement

7. Residents of East Jerusalem (on both sides of the separation barrier) will enjoy full civil and political rights as part of the Palestinian collective. Israeli residency status, alongside a Palestinian national identity, has so far defined the complex identity of East Jerusalem residents. Despite continuous attempts to undermine Palestinian connection to Jerusalem, this status has also helped to confirm it; it has largely enabled freedom of movement, granted partial socioeconomic rights, and provided a certain sense of stability. {8} An abrupt disruption or change that would generate panic and chaos must be avoided; instead, flexible and gradual procedures should be established that recognize Israel’s responsibility for the fate of East Jerusalem residents and that acknowledge their long-standing contribution to the city’s life and economy. Residency status in the State of Israel should not expire overnight; instead, the parties should agree on steps that allow for the gradual transition of status while protecting individual rights throughout the process. Other options—such as Palestinians retaining long-term Israeli residency or establishing a special residency status for Jerusalem—should not be ruled out under conditions to be agreed upon.

8. Freedom of movement will be maintained throughout the urban sphere for the city’s entire population. Oversight of movement in and out of the city will be conducted at the peripheral boundaries of the city and allow for freedom of movement within the city itself. {9} The city’s entry and exit requirements will be determined through coordination by both parties and mutual commitment to the principle of freedom of movement.

9. The labor market, hospitals, commercial and recreational areas will be open to all of Jerusalem's residents, Israelis and Palestinians. All the city’s residents will enjoy full social protection and comprehensive medical insurance as part of ensuring their welfare and personal security.

D. Security

10. Security arrangements will be based on a mutually determined, realistic, beneficial, and inclusive approach formulated with minimal disruption to freedom of movement and daily routines. October 7th demonstrated that even the most elaborate measures cannot provide hermetic security or replace good neighborly relations or diplomatic arrangements. At the same time, it significantly elevated anxiety levels and consequently increased physical and psychological dependence on security measures. Conversely, the relatively quick return to shared daily life in Jerusalem after October 7th helped restore at least a partial sense of security. Therefore, security arrangements should be based on a realistic conception of optimal security and on a horizon of hope for both sides and be developed with respect to cultural and gender sensitivities. Furthermore, civilian armament should end. In addition to the input of professional entities, the formulation of security arrangements should involve civilian, community, and religious actors from both sides, and, if necessary, international actors (as mentioned above). A parallel investment should be made to increase trust, cultivate tolerance, and promote non-violent ways of coping with fear.

E. Socioeconomic Development and a Shared Narrative

11. The formulation of a resolution for Jerusalem should include integrated processes between policymakers and civil society representatives (Top Down & Bottom Up) at all stages. The process should include experts and consultants from a wide variety of fields and formulate equitable notions of security and welfare that are sensitive to social, religious, and gender diversity and that take into account the daily experiences of the different groups living in the city, their perceptions of life, and their needs in a reality of conflict. Active civil society on both sides has a critical role to play in mediating these processes, fostering public readiness for the change to come, and creating an atmosphere of dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation. This process must take place based on a mutual commitment to self-determination, equality, and human rights.

12. From the very beginning of negotiations, and throughout their various stages, considerable investments must be channeled towards Jerusalem. Large-scale projects of cooperation and economic development for Palestinians and Israelis should be carried out in order for both populations to experience the immediate and concrete benefits of a political agreement and start building a shared story of growth, joint heritage, and peace. Additionally, significant investments should be made in order to mobilize broad public support for the agreement and highlight its immediate benefits. Widespread public and international support for the process, together with substantial and tangible benefits, will be crucial to the success of any agreement.

13. Along with promoting an outline for a solution and projects aimed at economic development, civil society on both sides must be harnessed to support projects that promote wide-scale dialogue initiatives, social entrepreneurship, and artistic and cultural activities. A cadre of opinion shapers must be trained to increase public support for the agreement. The aforementioned entities, along with political, communal, religious, artistic, and cultural leaders, should be partners in the design and implementation of a new story for Jerusalem. This story should be grounded in shared pride for the city’s uniqueness and symbolism, recognition and affirmation of its diverse populations, their heritage and contributions, and a perception of the political agreement as a success story.

Footnotes

2
Ir Amim, “Jerusalem: The Rising Cost of Peace” (Jerusalem: Ir Amim, February 2015); Lehrs, “Peace Talks Over Jerusalem.”
3
The peace plan (2020) presented by the first Trump administration embraced the idea of establishing a Palestinian capital to the east and north of the separation barrier, including Abu Dis and the East Jerusalem neighborhoods that the barrier currently separates from the city. This idea was intended to negate the basis for a Palestinian claim to East Jerusalem proper and sought to delineate a Palestinian capital under untenable urban and geographical conditions. These are peripheral areas unconnected to each other and of no symbolic importance in and of themselves, and they cannot constitute a substitute for East Jerusalem and its crucial historic and symbolic values. These ideas have already been rejected by Palestinians in the past. See Ir Amim, “Ramifications of the US Middle East Plan on the Future of Jerusalem” (Jerusalem: Ir Amim, April 2020).
4
Ir Amim, “Destructive Unilateral Measures to Redraw the Borders of Jerusalem” (Jerusalem: Ir Amim, January 2018).
5
During negotiations under the Barak government, progress was made toward an agreement in which the Jewish Quarter would remain under Israeli sovereignty. Israel also wanted the Armenian Quarter, or a corridor from it that would allow access to the Western Wall through Jaffa Gate, to be under Israeli sovereignty, but this matter remained in dispute. See Ir Amim, “Jerusalem: The Rising Cost of Peace” and Lehrs, “Peace Talks Over Jerusalem.”
6
Michael Bell, John Bell, and Michael Molloy, “Mandate Elements for the Old City Special Regime”, in Proposals for the Old City of Jerusalem, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, February 2010; Geneva Initiative, Jerusalem Reconsidered: Two Capitals, One Undivided City, March 2021; Menachem Klein, “Back from the Brink: An Israeli-Palestinian Proposal for Jerusalem”, IAI Commentaries 21 | 29, June 2021
7
See, for example, Ir Amim, “Ramifications of the US Middle East Plan.”
8
As stated by the Supreme Court, the status of East Jerusalem residents in Israel is unique by virtue of their being “indigenous residents” (Administrative Appeal 3268/14, Supreme Court of Israel, 2017).
9
See Geneva Initiative, “Jerusalem Reconsidered” and Klein, “Back from the Brink.”